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3UK Defence Supply Chain Relationships: a Study of Sustained Monopoly
Abstract
Business-to-business, supply chain relationships within sustained monopolies, such as those
within UK Defence Procurement, have received scant attention by Management Researchers.
This paper describes the results from a substantial, exploratory research project that used
Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework as a theoretical model. Surprisingly,
it revealed that many issues surrounding Supply Chain Management implementation were
similar to those found in ‘normal’ markets and that it played an important part in reducing the
inherently negative effects of monopolistic relationships. The research sheds new and useful
light on the dynamics of this unusual business situation for both managers and academics.
Keywords: Supply Chain Management, Monopoly, UK Defence Procurement
Introduction
Following the ending of the ‘Cold War’ in 1989, the UK Government has sought a ‘peace
dividend’ through a reduction in expenditure on defence. However, continued participation
in international conflicts and peace-keeping operations has required qualitative improvements
to military capability to be maintained. With equipment expenditure of £10,408 million in
2000/01 (DASA, 2002) this is still a strategically important element of UK Government
spending and as with other public sector areas, a relentless drive to achieve greater value for
money has been pursued. A crucial element of this strategy has been to overcome traditional
adversarial attitudes which have resulted in a succession of high-profile cost, time and project
performance overruns. The intention has been to establish long-term supply chain
partnerships with its industrial suppliers. However, in the face of global spending cutbacks
the continued concentration of the Defence Equipment Suppliers has resulted in an
increasingly monopolistic situation. This is a very high technology business dealing with
politically sensitive, limited availability goods and services in relationships that extend over
many years. Each side wields considerable power but, lack of trust and the option to leave
reduce efficiency, increase costs and offer little incentive to co-operate (Humphries &
Wilding, 2001, Palmer, 2001, Parker & Hartley 1997). Moreover, despite clear strategic
4intentions, the practical implementation of partnering arrangements by the UK Ministry of
Defence (MoD) have been slow, patchy and clouded by uncertainty over ways and means.
Furthermore, the fundamental differences of aims by both sides appear to make the selection
of common objectives difficult and problematic. Overcoming these difficulties is the
business problem currently faced by UK MoD’s Logistics teams and their industrial suppliers
as they attempt to create and manage complex supply chains delivering military spare parts,
repairs and design services to UK military forces world-wide.
This paper thus explores the role of Supply Chain Management (SCM) in the unusual
domain of long-term, monopolistic business-to-business relationships. We first examine
views from the literature, describe the difficult task of selecting an appropriate theoretical
framework and then describe a substantial research project carried out in the UK Defence
Procurement Organisation which employs both quantitative and qualitative methods. It
concludes from emergent supply chain relationship factors that the importance of SCM in
‘normal’ markets is replicated in the monopolistic relationships surveyed although, specific
adverse characteristic features are also revealed which may have parallels within the long-
term collaborative relationships found in other sectors. We believe this offers practitioners
useful guidance and academics with opportunities for further research.
Supply Chain Relationships
As already mentioned, the business of UK Defence Procurement is essentially the
management of supply chain relationships which accords with Tompkins (2000): to achieve
by co-operation ‘the synchronisation of the physical flow of goods from sourcing to
consumption’. In our brief review of the literature we therefore concentrate on the
importance of relationships to SCM and compare the private and public sectors. Our aim is
to expose the main dynamics in order to seek parallels with the research environment.
5SCM is viewed as an integrative, proactive approach to managing the total flow of a
distribution channel to the ultimate customer (Matthyssens & Van den Bulte, 1994). It aims
to increase customer service reliability and reduce inventory (Boddy et al, 2000) to lower
uncertainty and costs (Cooper & Ellram, 1993, Lamming, 1993, Bechtel & Jayaranth, 1997).
It therefore depends upon co-operative relationships throughout the Supply Chain in order to
achieve benefits for all participants (Stevens, 1989) and this involves closer relationships
between members which include trust, commitment and collaboration (Spekman et al, 1998).
The literature contains a great deal of holistic advice on how this should be achieved but, in
practice it is generally operationalised as the integration of chains of suppliers to better satisfy
customers (Christopher, 1997, Peck et al, 2000). Nevertheless, although suppliers recognise
the need to integrate with their customers, it is apparent that full SCM implementation is not
being achieved for a number of reasons (Spekman et al, 1998). The importance of long-term
partnering relationships to focussing on complex, problem solving (Hulme, 1997) is
acknowledged. But, the need to base these arrangements on openness, shared risks and
rewards that leverage the skills of each partner to achieve competitive performance not
achieved by the individual, is a step that firms find difficult to take (Lambert et al, 1996).
Many are still taking a short-term view which tends them towards adversarial relationships
(Braithwaite, 1998) and the development of partnering relationships is being obstructed by
poor communications allied to reluctance to accept attitudinal change (Anscombe & Kearney,
1994). Nevertheless, the obligational nature of these arrangements to overcome opportunistic
temptations is evident (Ellram & Edis, 1996) as is the importance of achieving good
business-to-business relationships through partnering as a foundation for achieving the
operational benefits of SCM (Cooper et al, 1997). We conclude that increased pressures from
customers in a more globalised business environment have forced commercial companies to
adopt closer relationships with their strategic partners but this demands a substantial
6investment in new management skills and cultural adaptation. UK Defence Procurement
supply chain relationships are similarly long termed, inextricably linked and characterised by
complex problems and moreover, being also driven by global market conditions
(concentration) and increased customer (MoD) sophistication to change (Humphries &
Wilding, 2001).
The review up to this point has predominantly concentrated on concepts developed in the
private sector but in comparison, relatively little research has examined SCM within the
public sector (Harland et al, 2000). Networking theory considers focal firms but not the
larger systems of public sector supply and, describes important context variables but does not
consider regulation. Porter’s (1980) strategic management framework focuses on individual
firm’s vertical integration strategies compared to their competitors but does not consider the
non-competitive aspects of the private sector. All offer some generalisable features that are
relevant but no one model or framework comprehensively addresses public sector SCM
relationships (Harland et al, 2000, Zheng, 1998). Harland et al (2000) in their UK Health
Authority research list the following distinctive features of public sector supply chain
organisations: large and specific services; remote customers; stakeholders are complex,
difficult to integrate and crucial to success; dedicated market suppliers; reduced availability
of alternatives; accountability to national interest rather than shareholders; the government
makes the rules and can sanction anti-competitiveness; investment cycles are long compared
to annual reports and returns on investment and finally, the government theme is dominated
by politics. These factors are confirmed by Brooks & Pawar’s (2000) research which also
concluded that the public sector is different and that the correlation with commercial supply
chain relationships cannot be taken as straight forward. However, given that SCM aims to
manage a limited number of complex business-to-business relationships over a longer term,
7there are some fundamental similarities of principle that seem to apply (Humphries &
Wilding, 2000).
In conclusion, the importance of improving relationships to achieve successful SCM
implementation appears to be well known to academia and business alike and, after more
than a decade, is still actively pursued as a strategy by the private and public sectors (Bectel
& Jayaram, 1997, Brooks & Pawar, 2000, Cooper et al, 1997). The literature has highlighted
a number of success and failure factors in the private sector and in more limited coverage of
the public sector, identified that similar business motivations exist but are complicated by
environmental and stakeholder factors. Although these criteria are useful to this research, a
significant gap exists when considering the very long, monopolistic supply chain
relationships of the type found within UK Defence Procurement (Humphries & Wilding,
2001). It is intended that our research would help to fill this void.
A Theoretical Framework for Research
A lack of research on business relationships within sustained monopolies hampered the
search for an appropriate model through which to view UK Defence Procurement
relationships. Both Porter’s (1980) Five Forces and Cox et al’s (2000) Relation Power
Analysis considered competition-limiting strategies but appeared to be optimised for use in
‘normal’ markets. However, Williamson's (1975) Economic Organisations Failure
Framework shown in Figure 1 appeared to offer a viable theoretical model for research
because it describes a stylised situation in a complex inter-organisational relationship where
the costs of managing the risk associated with human factors such as opportunism become
too high, the ‘market’ breaks down and forces a firm to internalise the business, in effect
creating an internal monopoly. It is thus possible to hypothesise that within a sustained
monopoly of the type found within UK Defence Procurement where neither side has the
8opportunity to escape, the lack of incentive to co-operate might help to perpetuate an
adversarial relationship characterised by the features within the boxes of Figure 1 (Humphries
& Wilding, 2000). In this situation the sides do the minimum necessary under the terms of
the contract, they take short-term decisions which may cost more in the long-run, because of
lack of trust they are reluctant to share proprietary information and may even deliberately
distort disclosures such as inflating cost figures in order to justify higher prices, they will
opportunistically seek their own objectives rather than and at the expense or joint ones and
finally, lack of trust will promote a reliance on the small print of the contract which limits
flexibility and adds cost. Examples of these adverse features are certainly portrayed by the
press as a tradition of UK Defence Procurement (Humphries & Wilding, 2000) although it
should be noted that Williamson (1975) described the arrows in the framework as
‘influences within an environment’ rather than a causal interactions. We thus decided to use
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Figure 1. Economic Organisations Failure Framework (adapted from Williamson (1975)
 Destructive competition
 Reduced Business Gains
 Economic Power Reduced
 Low Inefficiency
The Monopoly Environment
9unusual dynamics within UK Defence Procurement relationships. The aim our research was
to test this model by seeking empirical evidence of strength and character of each of its 5
dimensions within the relationships examined.
In conclusion, there has been considerable transaction cost economics research which has
investigated interorganisational relationships and public utility monopolies but, it has not
been well-integrated and no study has utilised Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure
Framework in its entirety (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). This research therefore proposed to
exploit this gap whilst examining UK Defence Procurement business relationships.
Methodology - Measuring Relationship Characteristics
The research aims were thus to understand the relationship dynamics within long-term,
collaborative businesses and to determine if relational success factors found within SCM such
as trust and collaborative working arrangements were able to assist UK Defence Procurement
managers to break out of the essentially negative situation represented by Figure 1. An
exploratory research project was designed which used the key informant methods of surveys
(600 staff questionnaires – 5 point Likert scales) supported by 115 team-leader semi-
structured interviews. It took a wide, cross-sectional perspective in order to make a statement
about the outcomes of broadly comparable experiences using numerical supporting evidence.
The questionnaire questions listed at Appendix 1 were selected from a pool based in the
literature and grouped to correspond with the 5 theoretical framework dimensions. On the
premise that UK Defence supply chains might contain a spectrum of business relationships,
the opposites of the negative definitions of Williamson’s (1975) framework were used to
label the groups and, questions with a positive orientation were used (validated by focus
groups of practitioners during the research pilot phase).
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A self-selected census, (where the MoD managers chose the relationships to be
researched), of 54 monopolistic, two-party relationships representing £575.8m annual spend
within the UK Defence Procurement Organisation (a 10% sample by value) allowed the
collection and analysis of large quantities of data to determine the range and strength of
factors within the conceptual framework. It was acknowledged that such a sample could
generate skewed results however, follow-up analysis indicated a wide cross-section of the
Defence Logistics Organisation businesses in terms of size, spend and maturity participated
which led us to believe that sample bias could be ignored. These businesses procured very
high technology, military equipment spare parts, repair and engineering design services and
each team was composed of engineers, procurement, finance and commercial staffs. The
project also took a relational perspective in identifying the main types of interaction and thus
included data collection by qualitative methods in order to capture the richness of perceptions
needed to gain insight into the subtleties and cultural depth of the business problem. The
method employed was to survey as many and as wide a cross-section of the team members in
each pair of businesses as possible and to record and manipulate the results in Microsoft
Excel spreadsheets. Once the team-leaders had studied the results, each was interviewed
separately to determine the perceived reasons for the statistical results. Over 700 key points
were selected from the semi-structured interviews and stored in a Microsoft Access database
and organised for analysis by theoretical dimension, supply chain characteristics and
relationship. Special attention was devoted to providing feedback to the research participants
by means of individual relationship reports as well as head office and web-based summaries
of the research findings. The production of independent, frank relationship information was
highly valued by the organisations involved and in many cases relationship maintenance
arrangements received a much-needed boost as a result.
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An innovative data analysis approach was adopted which allowed the quantitative results
to reveal the broad statistical trends, the qualitative results to reveal the richness of the
business interactions and, a means of relating both back to the theoretical framework. This is
shown in Appendix 2 where each dimension is first defined and its mean satisfaction score
from the quantitative data is given. Then, within emergent qualitative data groupings,
example semi-structured interview key points are used to illustrate the strengths of
respondent’s feelings. The next Section provides conclusions from this data.
Relationship Dynamics - Findings
Dimension 1 - Relationship Creativity. The overall mean satisfaction score of 59% was
generally supported by the tone of the qualitative data. In summary, successful relationships
occurred when innovative contracts existed which reduced costs and promoted customer
focus. Moreover, organisational arrangements that promoted consistency and performance
improvements were also valued. However, it appeared that both deliberate and unconscious
expediency often came into play that reduced relationship effectiveness (people have only so
much capacity to rationalise what is going on around them and they therefore naturally limit
their performance to the adequate rather than the optimum (Simon, 1957)).
Dimension 2 – Relationship Stability. Forward-looking, holistic partnering arrangements
supported by customer-focussed, supply chain-bolstering activities were detected. With a
mean satisfaction rating of 51% however, there were a similar number of instances of
negative approaches such as insular practices, disruptive organisational changes and short-
term strategies that promoted rather than countered the adverse effects of uncertainty and
complexity (Williamson, 1975).
Dimension 3 – Communication. Although the mean satisfaction rating was only just above
parity at 51%, practitioners’ comments were generally positive. Overall the importance of
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Supply Chain communication was understood and efforts were being made to improve but,
there were very few examples where full supply chain integration could be demonstrated.
Some instances of information impactedness (the imbalance caused by selective information
disclosures, and distortions which are difficult or expensive to verify at the time and which
undermine the durability of contract arrangements (Williamson, 1975)) were detected and
linked directly to a feeling of powerlessness due to the monopolistic situation. But, the
practical difficulties of providing regular, management focus on order book performance
through the use of joint performance measurement and service level systems appeared to be
the key issues.
Dimension 4 - Relationship Reliability. This dimension had the lowest mean satisfaction
score of 49% which indicated that the practical implementation of SCM was considered to be
difficult. A number of positive SCM aspects such as striving to improve quality ethos,
service delivery and process improvement were observed in the data. However,
environmental limitations on time, budget and investment and, product technical complexity
and age had a strong bearing on the monopolistic business environment under scrutiny. It is
evident that instances of opportunistic behaviour (a lack of candour or honesty and includes
self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1979)) were prompted as reactions to these
features.
Dimension 5 – Relationship Quality. This dimension achieved the highest mean satisfaction
score of 66%. However, the qualitative data gave a generally more pessimistic impression
although managers generally felt that they had no option but to try and make the best of their
situation. There appeared to be clear evidence of working together in the best interests of
relationships but, in many cases the sides felt trapped and at the mercy of the other sides’
budgetary, commercial and bureaucratic vagaries. In a small numbers situation, the parties
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could resort to countering problematic behaviours, including lack of trust, by providing
increasingly sophisticated controls that could, by reducing managers’ freedom of action
precipitate a further reduction of trust and a negative cycle of reactions (Williamson, 1979).
Discussion of Results
Contrary to expectations, a diversity of positive, business-driven behaviours as well as more
adverse monopolistic dynamics were present within the UK Defence Procurement
environment. The mean satisfaction scores by dimension from the quantitative data findings
shown in Figure 2 usefully revealed that the essentially negative Organisations Failure
Framework was not so in practice with an overall success rating of 57%.
These findings are borne out by the data described in the previous section. Difficulties in
achieving effective SCM implementation could be traced to the normal, commercial
difficulties surrounding order book performance, joint objectives and service level systems































Figure 2. Overall Conceptual Framework Results by Dimension
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problems such as old products, obsolescence, staff and organisational upheavals, poor end-
customer visibility and lack of investment in modern procedures and systems seemed to
accentuate managers’ frustrations due to lack of freedom of action and promoted the
relationship negativity implied by the theoretical framework. As predicted by the model, lack
of investment in specific assets such as work force stability and product/process
development, the use of inadequate performance measures, opportunistically providing poor
goods and services and, using proprietary information as a weapon, reduced the chances of
achieving interdependence and equitable outcomes. On the other hand despite the adverse
monopolistic influences, strong counterbalancing, positive business drivers were able to
produce examples of relationship-building, specific investments, co-operative behaviour,
open communications and a desire to reduce the burden of governance through more
equitable, long-term arrangements.
Although the research was designed to take an aggregate view of the data and did not
differentiate between the views of the MoD and Industry respondents, it was noticeable that
qualitative opinions were reasonably balanced. However, quantitatively MoD staffs were
less optimistic (59%) than Industry (67%). Statistical analysis indicates that this difference is
not significant with a high correlation factor of 0.928 (Sapsford, 1999). From the data
collected no explanation could be found for the difference in perception but further research
into the phenomenon might prove interesting.
This research aimed to provide an understanding of the supply chain relationship
dynamics within long-term, collaborative businesses of the type found within UK Defence
Procurement and, to provide managers in this environment with some pointers on successful
partnering within monopolistic businesses. The findings have exposed the reasons for
tensions within the MoD/Industry relationships and described the success factors that appear
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to prevail in the face of the potential difficulties described in Figure 1. Some advice for
practitioners is given later but next we describe the implications for theory.
Implications for Theory
Williamson’s (1975) Organisations Failure Framework was selected as the theoretical model
because it appeared to provide a means of examining the relational dynamics within a
sustained monopolistic business. Because the business focus was collaborative supply chain
management, the relational aspects of SCM were used as the theoretical field with which
expose the interactions between the pairs of business partners using an exploratory research
methodology. From the emergent groupings of qualitative data reinforced by the quantitative
satisfaction ratings revealed by the questionnaires it was found that despite the forced
partnership monopolistic situation, the process efficiency aims of SCM as found in ‘normal’
markets were present. Also, although considerable efforts were being devoted to improving
SCM performance, in concert with Spekman et al’s (1998) commercial sector findings,
successfully implemented examples were difficult to achieve. However, negative behaviour
symptomatic of the theoretical monopoly environment was also prominent. This included
evidence of managers’ frustration at the lack of freedom of action where relationship
‘carelessness’ destroyed trust (Macbeth & Ferguson, 1994). Lambert et al’s (1996)
Partnering process model demonstrates the important features that impact upon partners when
establishing and maintaining a partnership and describes a continuous improvement approach
with the reinforcement of success. Under monopolistic conditions the partners have no
choice in the arrangement and depending on the degree of negativity affecting the business
drivers for co-operation and the facilitators deployed to operationalise the relationship will,
through a negative feedback loop, potentially generate a self-reinforcing, low quality
relationship (Humphries & Wilding, 2004). We conclude that these findings support
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Williamson’s (1975) concepts when applied to sustained, public sector, monopolistic,
business relationships and moreover, provide additional evidence that builds upon Spekman
et al’s (1998) work in addressing the reasons why SCM relationships are difficult to
implement and sustain.
Advice for Practitioners
As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, UK Defence Procurement relationships are
extremely important to both national and industrial policies such that any improvements in
performance is likely to be extremely beneficial to all concerned. This research has taken an
innovative approach to the analysis of this important situation and as a result has highlighted
a primary lesson for managers operating within these sustained monopolies. If they are to
achieve the Government’s demand for improved value for money in UK Defence spending
through partnering relationships with industry there is a prime need to accept that the
monopoly environment will inevitably reduce relationship quality due to the limited
availability of options for action. Allowing frustration and generate negative behaviours to
enter a negative cycle only results in poor returns for both sides. On the contrary, it is
essential to build an inventory of environmental problems that are normally considered to be
‘unavoidable features of the business’ and jointly seek innovative ways of dealing with them.
Synchronised objectives, pursuing joint approaches to service and product delivery, lowering
costs and risks and promoting measures to support the growth of trust appear to be the best
ways of mitigating the negative influences of the endemic monopoly situation on supply
chain relationships. Finally, the research has proved the benefit of an independent, 3rd party
review of supply chain relationship development and suggests that periodic repeats would
allow areas for joint management attention to be targeted.
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Further Research Opportunities
This research has, for the first time achieved a high level, cross-relationship (UK
MoD/Industry) perspective of a significant sample of sustained monopoly businesses and this
supply chain activity continues to struggle to achieve its objectives in a market that becomes
more and more restricted. Further research is necessary to build on our initial, exploratory
efforts in order to probe more deeply into an extremely interesting area. It would be useful to
repeat the approach in order to obtain a longitudinal view of the relationships to determine
what change is occurring over time and why and provide more detailed understanding of the
organisational and personal interactions. Such an approach could be aimed at providing more
specific improvement programmes and be targeted both tactically and strategically.
Traditionally economics has taken a rather limited view of monopoly in areas such as the
governance arrangements for public utilities or the application of anti-trust legislation
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). This research echoes Parker and Hartley’s conclusions that
economists might also find the examination of ‘public interest’ monopolies interesting.
Lastly, there are possible similarities between the UK Defence monopolistic supply chain
relationships and long term collaborations in the private sector. Not only would the repeat of
our research approach in the commercial arena, both nationally and internationally,
triangulate our findings but it might also offer researchers another way of cross-tabulating
their own projects. It should be emphasised that none of these opportunities for research
should be viewed in isolation; many of them overlap and converge to offer the chance to
carry out integrated research programmes.
Conclusion
The literature suggests that the little known about the relationship dynamics within
monopolies presupposes negative outcomes. However, this research has shown that this is
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not the case, and that within the relationships examined a spectrum of positive and negative
results were found. This is especially interesting because it demonstrates that Supply Chain
Management factors, as described in ‘normal’ markets literature, are equally important
success factors in monopolistic business. The research findings thus shed new light in an
area that has received little attention by management researchers (Palmer, 2001, Parker &
Hartley, 1997). They also provide valuable practical advice to managers and offer academics
a potentially interesting agenda for future research to gain extended perspectives of long-
term, collaborative, supply chain relationships.
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Appendix 1 – Questionnaire Dimensions and Questions
1. Bounded Rationality - Creativity: promoting quality, innovation and long-term approach
by encouraging high performance.
a. The relationship encourages the achievement of high performance by both parties ie.
reliable equipment, on-time delivery, good forecasts.
b. The relationship encourages us to be innovative in the way we do business.
c. Performance measurement is used to raise standards.
d. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'quickly'.
e. Disputes & problems are resolved: 'fairly'.
f. The other party is reliable and consistent in dealing with us.
g. The other party is dedicated to making our business a success.
h. When an unexpected problem arises, both parties would rather work out a solution than
hold each other to the original contract terms.
2. Uncertainty/Complexity - Stability: synchronisation of objectives and confidence
building.
a. The other party displays a sound, strategic understanding of our business.
b. The objectives of both parties are clearly stated.
c. The objectives of both parties are fully compatible.
d. Both parties co-operate wholeheartedly.
e. The relationship provides a dynamic business environment within which both parties can
seek increasing rewards.
f. I have complete confidence in the intentions of the other party.
3. Information Impactedness - Communication: shared data environment, openness,
common performance measures, frequent interaction.
a. Where the other party has proprietary information that could improve the performance of
the joint business, it is freely available.
b. We would welcome a shared data environment where planning, technical and pricing
information are made freely available.
c. We understand the information requirements of all participants in the support chain from
sub-contractors to end-user.
d. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally – not
just according to specified agreement.
e. Objective performance measurement is an important part of this relationship.
f. We are aware of the performance requirements for all participants in the support chain
from sub-contractors to end-user.
g. We provide the other party with regular information including long-range forecasts to
enable him to do his business better.
4 Opportunism - Reliability: concentrating on service and product delivery, lowering joint
costs and risks, building up trust.
a. The quality of the contract outputs ie. spares/repairs/services, is entirely satisfactory.
b. The quality of service delivery ie. delivery times, billing, payment, is entirely
satisfactory.
c. The relationship is characterised by a continually improving quality ethos.
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d. Problems are solved in a joint, open, constructive manner.
e. Such is the goodwill in the relationship, the other party would willingly put himself out
to adapt to our changing requirements.
f. We trust the other party to act in our best interests.
g. The responsibility for making sure the relationship works is shared jointly.
h. The other party provides us with useful cost reduction and quality improvement ideas.
i. The other party is always totally open and honest with us.
j. The other party always does what he says he will do.
5. Small Numbers - Quality: creating a win-win relationship in which each side is delighted
to be a part.
a. The gains from this relationship are equally shared between both parties.
b. We do not feel imprisoned within the current relationship.
c. We are willing to invest more ie. money, time, information, effort, in the current
relationship.
d. We are happy that our future is bound to the success of our relationship partner.
e. We feel totally committed to this relationship.
f. The other party is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds.
g. Both sides are working to improve this relationship.
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Appendix 2 – Qualitative Data Analysis Examples
Dimension Definition Emergent Grouping Example Practitioner Comments
‘Now we have a partnering arrangement
around a good framework contract we just
concentrate of the customer – we no longer
refer to the small print’
‘Enabling contracts reduce admin costs by
freeing us from frequent competitions as
long as the company continues to
demonstrate it has given us best value for
money’
‘We used to keep a pool of items to feed
into repair. With our new partnering
arrangement we track individual items and






‘The benefits of the partnering arrangement
are we are ‘future-proofed’, uncertainty is
removed, we can plan and most
importantly, we can really focus on the
customer’
‘This is real support chain management; the
mechanism is invisible to the end customer’
Service delivery
‘Industry is still rooted in the past; it is not
yet prepared for long-term service
provision’
‘My team is only 60 strong and small is
beautiful. We seem to be able to do more
with less. We concentrate on essentials; the
nice to do only encourage growth in
overheads’
‘The company is dealing with an old
product, the spares are in short-supply,
there are obsolescence problems and on top
of that, its organisation is poorly focussed’
‘We now sit down with the customer to
write his Post Design Services














‘The relationship between our people is
excellent but frequent staff changes in their
team disrupt our working arrangements and
incur costs’
‘We organised a training day on the
Ministry of Defence’s site to educate their
staff about the company and its products.
Knowledge about each other’s business is
important to our professional relationship’
Customer focus
‘They don’t seem to understand we have
lead times; they often want it ‘tomorrow’
‘We aim for a 10, 12, 15 or even 30 year
contract. This fosters a long-term ethos,
cuts the costs of frequent renegotiations and
allows the Firm to plan and resource’
Commercial
understanding
‘We gave them a proper solution. They
said it was too expensive. We cut back and








Co-operation ‘They are always thinking ahead; wanting
22
Dimension Definition Emergent Grouping Example Practitioner Comments
to know our budget over the next 4 years,
our equipment plans, what they can do to
enhance its performance and, exploring
how they can offer better support services’
‘All stakeholders were involved in the
project including the end-customers who
helped design the performance targets. The
same people are now involved in
implementation'
‘I feel really let down that the current
review by the Ministry of Defence into a
new project has cut us out and ignored our
long experience’
‘The commercial side is the weakest. They
still have traditional views. We put in a lot




‘Quarterly review meetings where
outstanding orders are discussed have led to
much improved product availability’
Working level
communication
People do talk more freely and there is a
genuine desire to solve problems in an open
manner’ keep the team focussed’
‘All support chain parties, including the end
customer, attend planning meetings to
discuss requirements, pool knowledge and
resolve problems’
‘We have simple, obvious, open
performance measures. Every week the
firm sends a statement of work achieved,
problems encountered and forecasts. We
provide them with consumption data.












‘We are starting to face up to performance
issues at our regular meetings. In the past
mutual defensiveness has got in the way of
making improvements. This is a very hard
area to tackle ’
Quality & continuous
improvement
‘Quality issues are ignored by the Supplier.
We have offered to help but it was refused’
‘We feel that we have to keep the pressure
on price and delivery to keep the Firm on




‘It’s a problem maintaining 30 year old
equipment. It’s used and abused and we
have difficulty finding people and sub-








joint costs and risks,
building up trust
Business practices ‘They have taken on additional tasks
without the resources. They now don’t
have the staff to chase their sub-contractors
who let them down'
‘We are determined to support this ageing
weapon system even though it does not bear











development ‘There is a bit of the old ‘cost-plus, bowler-
hatted’ attitude on both sides that we must
work together to overcome’
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Dimension Definition Emergent Grouping Example Practitioner Comments
‘Our fear is the feast and famine situation of
Defence spending. There are times when
we must stop work, lay off experienced
staff and then race to get back going again.
I worry that we cannot respond fast enough






level of equity in the
partnership
‘Their worry is that because we are their
single source and have changed hands a
couple of times in the last 10 years, we
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